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Multiple scales in metapopulations can give rise to paradoxical behaviour: in a conceptual model
for a public goods game, the species associated with a fitness cost due to the public good production
can be stabilised in the well-mixed limit due to the mere existence of these scales. The scales in this
model involve a length scale corresponding to separate patches, coupled by mobility, and separate
time scales for reproduction and interaction with a local environment. Contrary to the well-mixed
high mobility limit, we find that for low mobilities, the interaction rate progressively stabilises this
species due to stochastic effects, and that the formation of spatial patterns is not crucial for this
stabilisation.
Ecological populations have evolved into systems
where a variety of length and time scales exist due to
patterns, heterogeneities, or temporal variations in the
states of individual agents [1]. For example, populations
dwell in spatial sub-structures of separate or fragmented
habitats, in which the species form a tight community
and are essentially well-mixed [2, 3]. On larger scales,
these habitats are then coupled by migration or disper-
sal. Similarly, individuals take up nutrients and interact
with their local environments more frequently than they
reproduce or die. The impact of such multiple length and
time scales on ecosystems is associated with the mainte-
nance of biodiversity, where separate scales can stabilise
subpopulations which would otherwise die out [4, 5].
In order to investigate this complex interplay of differ-
ent scales, we study a simplified model system for two
different species with interacting individuals. With this
model, we can tune the frequency of interaction events
and dispersal, and thus evaluate the importance of the
fitness
f
P
D
a) Interact and update fitness
b) Reproduce
ω
∝f
µ
c) Move
FIG. 1: We study a public goods game between the good’s
producers (blue circles) and non-producers/defectors (red
pentagons) with separate interaction (fitness update) and re-
production steps, which both take place locally on a patch ν.
The fitness is updated when bacteria sense their local envi-
ronment with rate ω (a). Reproduction occurs via a Moran
process proportional to a player’s fitness f (b). The separa-
tion of these steps means that players with different fitness
values are present (colour shades). We study patches on a
two-dimensional lattice, where a hopping rate µ couples dif-
ferent patches (c).
coupling between two specific length and time scales. We
show that even for very simple interactions, the interplay
of these scales leads to counterintuitive phenomenology.
Indeed, recent advances in both microbial [6, 7] as well as
interacting systems built with nucleic acids [8–10] mean
that such scales will be accessible experimentally, which
helps elucidate ecological principles and control matter
on small scales, respectively [11–13]. Theoretical models
can assist both these experimental advances by identify-
ing what interaction principles are ecologically viable or
can lead to interesting effects in these experiments.
A well-understood type of interaction are public goods
games, which have been demonstrated in a variety of mi-
croorganisms, from bakterioplankton to yeast [14–20]. In
such games, players receive fitness benefits due to the
presence of a public good, which is produced only by a
part of the population (‘producers’) [21]. In theoretical
models for this scenario [22–24], such as the prisoner’s
dilemma [25, 26], public good production incurs a fitness
cost for the producers. Due to this cost, producers in
well-mixed populations in the prisoner’s dilemma always
die out. Thus, we will analyse the impact of the interplay
of time scales (associated with the frequency of interac-
tion events) and length scales (associated with spatial
structure) for this game as deviations from this simple
outcome.
Here, we discuss how reducing fitness updates (asso-
ciated with an interaction or sensing rate) progressively
stabilises producers up to finite costs in the small mobil-
ity limit. In the large mobility limit, the mere existence
of multiple scales (temporal interaction frequency, and
spatial structure) leads to a sharp jump in the stability
of producers, as compared to a situation where reproduc-
tion and interaction occur in one step. Thus, producers
are paradoxically stabilised by increasing mobility in this
system, even though in diffusive well-mixed systems pro-
ducers should die out [27–29].
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2MODEL
We consider a metapopulation of spatially separate
subpopulations on patches arranged on a square lattice
(Fig. 1). Patches initially contain N0 players each, and
are coupled by hopping with rate µ (Fig. 1 c), which then
changes the number of players on a patch. Interactions
only happen locally on a patch ν of this metapopula-
tion [2, 30–33], as opposed to between players on different
patches [34–38].
The interaction rate ω determines how often a player
interacts with its environment locally on its patch and
then updates its fitness f to reflect the environment ac-
cordingly (see Fig. 1 a). As players retain their fitness
from the time when they last sensed their environment,
the fitness of players on a patch can vary (colour shades
in Fig. 1). In microbes, the fitness generally increases
with the amount public good on a patch, which in turn
increases with the number of producers P on a patch ν
of Nν players. Microbial experiments have shown that
the relationship between the fitness and the numbers of
producers on a patch can be complex, and often non-
linear [17, 39]. Since we are interested in a conceptual
model that may apply to both ecological as well as en-
gineered populations, we opted for a simple and general
form for the fitness. Thus, we assume that the fitness
obtained during such an interaction event scales linearly
with the number of producers P on a patch of Nν play-
ers (see e. g. [40–45]). We note that in these models,
producers can also profit from the public good that they
produce themselves. The assumption that the fitness de-
pends linearly on P means that our model is concep-
tual and amenable to simple analysis. A different type of
monotonously increasing fitness functions will not change
our results for small mobility qualitatetively, and our ar-
guments for large mobility can also be adapted to such
nonlinear fitness functions. The fitness of the part of the
population that does not produce the public good (‘de-
fectors’ D) on a patch with NP producers is thus
fDNP = f0 +
NP
Nν
b, (1)
where we set both the base fitness f0 = 1, as well as the
benefit of the public good b = 1, to one. The fitness of
a producer on a patch with NP producers is lower than
that fitness by a cost c, which corresponds to the cost of
producing the public good:
fPNP = f
D
NP − c. (2)
We consider c < 1 so that the benefit is higher than the
cost of public good production.
We assume that players on a given patch reproduce
proportionally to their fitness according to the frequency-
dependent Moran process [46], by replacing another ran-
domly selected player on the same patch (Fig. 1 b) [47–
52]. In order to assure that players cannot reproduce
themselves, we defined reproduction rates as r = f(1 −
1/Nν), such that in this work, the largest possible re-
production rate for a producer at zero cost for the mean
number of players per site is rP = 2(1 − 1/N0), and
the minimal reproduction rate for a defector is rD =
(1− 1/N0) [74].
We focus on ω > rP throughout, such that players have
on average updated their fitness before reproducing.
Initially, equal numbers of defectors and producers are
distributed randomly in the metapopulation of L × L
patches. We use a Gillespie algorithm [53] to simulate the
stochastic dynamics of the system until either producers
or defectors have gone extinct.
LOW MOBILITY LIMIT
We will start by elucidating the dynamics of the
metapopulation in the small mobility limit, µ  rP <
ω. Since hopping is rare in this limit, patches on the
metapopulation fixate to either producers or defectors
before the first movement occurs. When the number of
individuals on each patch is small, N0c  1, the dy-
namics is dominated by demographic fluctuations while
fitness differences play only a subordinate role [54]. In-
deed, in our system we are mostly concerned with values
of cost c 1 (as we will see in the following), and so this
criterion applies. Thus, the number of patches on which
producers fixate is approximately equal to the number of
patches where defectors fixate.
On timescales longer than fixation, hopping events oc-
cur, whereby a single player hops from its patch to a
neighbouring patch. For small mobility, this new patch
will likely fixate again before another player hops. The
process of fixation on the entire metapopulation can thus
only occur via a series of single player hops and subse-
quent fixation on single patches. One can naively assume
that if the probability that a producer invades a patch of
defectors is higher than the probability that a defector
will invade a patch of producers, producers will fixate in
the metapopulation. Hence, we will first concentrate on
the probability that a player successfully invades a patch
fixated to the other type.
Single patch invasion
Players on fixated patches all have the same fitness
(fitness fPN0 = 1 + N0/N0 − c = 2 − c on patches with
producers, and the lowest possible fitness of 1 for defec-
tors). Immediately after a hopping event, the invading
player will retain its fitness from its previous (fixated)
patch if the interaction rate ω is finite. Thus, an invad-
ing producer has an advantage on the stack of defectors
initially, due to its higher fitness, while the opposite is
the case for the invading defector. This advantage of
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FIG. 2: Cost c∗ up to which producers fixate for small mo-
bilities: a) Single patch invasion probability of a producer
(solid) or defector (dashed lines) on a patch of Nν = N0 = 6
defectors or producers, respectively (i.e. seven players total,
Ns = 7). Smaller ω (error bars show 95% confidence inter-
val) increases the cost of equal invasion probability c∗, from
the ω → ∞ limit. b) Possible transitions (arrows) between
player configurations in the transition probability matrix. c)
Rescaled c∗ for a variety of N0 in a metapopulation (L = 20)
(filled symbols) agrees with the corresponding c∗ from single
patch invasions (empty symbols), and scales linearly in 1/ω.
The estimate from Tω,2 for N0 = 2 players correctly shows
this scaling with ω. d) Fixation probability P for ω = 20 in
the metapopulation becomes sharper, but does not change its
value for increasing L.
the producer occurs for a variety of models with delayed
fitness updates [55–58] or memory [59]. Here, we inves-
tigate its impact by tuning the rate ω. In the following,
we show how one can understand the impact of this rate
ω on fixation using Markov chains, independently of the
precise choice of the fitness function.
In order to emphasise that we are discussing a single
patch in the following, we refer to the number of players
on this single patch by Ns. Since we are concerned with
cases where one player of one type fixates on a patch
with N0 players of the other type, the Ns relevant for
understanding the metapopulation is Ns = N0 + 1. We
refer to this successful single patch fixation probability of
one player of a particular type as the invasion probability.
Immediate interaction with the local environment
We start with the invasion probability of a producer
(defector) on a patch of defectors (producers) in the limit
of ω →∞, before decreasing ω. Then, interactions occur
so often that the fitness values of players always reflect
their local environment, and, in particular, that the fit-
ness of the invading player is updated immediately.
Transition probability matrix. The probability that
this invading player fixates can be calculated by consider-
ing the transition probability matrix for the correspond-
ing Markov chain [60, 61]. This transition probability
matrix is constructed by calculating the transition proba-
bilities from any possible state, corresponding to any pos-
sible configuration of players on this patch, into any other
possible state. For ω →∞, the fitness of all Ns players is
always updated to reflect the configuration on the patch.
Since all fitness values are then uniquely determined by
the numbers of producers on a patch (see Eq. 1), there
are exactly as many states as there are configurations of
different numbers of producers on the patch. In general,
there are Ns + 1 such states (for zero up to Ns produc-
ers on the patch). For Ns = 3, we sketch these states
in Fig. 2 b, with the different fitness values encoded in
the colour scale. The arrows indicate which states a par-
ticular state can transition into through reproduction of
a player. The corresponding transition probabilities are
proportional to the reproduction rate of that player.
The probabilities to be in one of these different con-
figurations make up the Ns + 1- dimensional probability
vector. More precisely, the ith entry in our probability
vector corresponds to the configuration with i produc-
ers, for i ∈ {0, Ns}. The fitness of defectors in state i is
then fDi = f0 + i/Ns = 1 and f
P
i = f
D
i − c. Thus, the
transition probability matrix for Ns = 3 reads
T3 =

1 T−1 0 0
0 T d1 T
−
2 0
0 T+1 T
d
2 0
0 0 T+2 1
 ,
where T−i denotes the probability to transition from
state i to state i−1, and T+i the probability to transition
from state i to i+ 1. In our case, T−1 = f
D
1 /(2f
D
1 + f
P
1 )
corresponds to the probability that a defector in a state
with one producer replaces that producer, while T+1 =
fP1 /(2f
D
1 +f
P
1 ) denotes the probability that the producer
replaces one defector. Similarly, T−2 = f
D
2 /(f
D
1 + 2f
P
1 )
and T+2 = f
P
2 /(f
D
1 +2f
P
1 ) correspond to analogous events
for the state with two producers. The diagonal elements
T d1 = 1− (T−1 + T+1 ) (T d2 = 1− (T−2 + T+2 )) contain the
probabilty that a defector (producer) replaces another
player of its type. Since this is a stochastic probability
matrix, the entries of a columns add up to one.
Repeated iteration of this transition probability matrix
on the initial state (in our case, that containing only one
producer) converges to a probability distribution with
two non-zero elements corresponding to the absorbing
states [60] (in our case, the first and last elements, corre-
sponding to states with only defectors or only producers).
The transition probability from a state of one producer
into the absorbing state with all producers (which we
refer to as invasion probability I) is known analytically
4from a first step analysis [60, 62–64], and reads
IP =
1
1 +
∑Ns−1
i=1 qi
, (3)
where qi =
∏k
j=1
T−j
T+j
.
Invasion probability to first order linear in c. For small
cost, an expansion of this equation in cost is accurate and
more intuitive. To first order in c, the probability that a
single producer successfully invades a patch of defectors
for the ω →∞ limit reads
IP ≈ 1
Ns
− c
N2s
Ns−1∑
i=1
Ns − i
fDi
, (4)
where fDi is the fitness of a defector in a state with i pro-
ducers. Intuitively, the sum is over all states that need
to be transitioned through in order to arrive at the ab-
sorbing state; each term contains the number of defectors
that can be replaced in that state, and their fitness. The
analogous expression for invasion probability of a defec-
tor is
ID ≈ 1
Ns
+
c
N2s
Ns−1∑
i=1
i
fDi
(5)
. This expansion only depends on the fitness being linear
in c, not on the linearity of the fitness function with re-
spect to public good producers (provided that the states
with only producers and defectors are the two absorbing
states).
Figure 2 a shows the invasion probability from this ex-
pansion (grey dashed-dotted line) for Ns = 7. The solid
decreasing line (dashed increasing line) corresponds to
the invasion probability for a producer (defector). The
invasion probabilities are equal only at zero cost, where
they have the value 1/Ns, i.e. the probability for fixation
of one out of Ns players in a Moran process. As the in-
vasion probability of producers decreases with increasing
c, this implies that for ω →∞, producers die out.
Delayed interaction with the environment
Using simple arguments from Markov chains, we have
learnt that the probability for successful invasion (or fix-
ation) of a producer into a patch of defectors tends to
be lower than the invasion probability of a single defec-
tor into a patch of producers, apart from at zero cost,
where the two are equal. Now, we ask how a delay in in-
teractions (and thereby in adjusting fitness to reflect the
current environment) affects these invasion probabilities
by considering finite interaction rates ω.
Transition probability matrix: increase in state space
For finite ω, additional states corresponding to play-
ers with different fitnesses from previous configurations
would need to be included. These additional states corre-
spond to configurations where the fitness of some players
is not updated, but corresponds to their previous envi-
ronment. For simplicity, we explain the structure of the
transition probability matrix for Ns = 2 players with one
invading players, i.e. Ns + 1 = 3 players per patch, in
the appendix. We note here that a brute force first step
analysis (or diagonalisation) of these transition probabil-
ity matrices becomes unintuitive already for such a small
number of players. Numerical solution is possible, and in-
deed, we discuss and show such a numerical result later
for comparison. For now, we turn to numerical simula-
tions of the invasion probabilities on a single patch.
We show these numerical simulations for invasion prob-
abilities for Ns = 7 for both with ω = 20 and ω = 5 in
Fig. 2 a, where error bars denote 95% confidence inter-
vals. We note that these lines are approximately parallel
to the first order expansion for ω → ∞, meaning that
finite ω leads to a parallel shift in invasion probabilities.
Thus, we find that the effect of reducing the frequency
of interactions is that the invasion probabilities for pro-
ducers and defectors are shifted up- or downwards, re-
spectively. This shift means that for decreasing ω, the
invasion probabilities are equal at a finite cost c∗.
Cost c∗ at small mobility
After having understood the single patch invasion
probabilities, we turn to the metapopulation of L × L
patches. In Fig. 2 c, we show this c∗, the highest cost up
to which producers can fixate, for a variety of ω and two
different N0.
We take c∗ for the metapopulation to be the cost where
exactly half the simulation runs fixate to producers. The
transition from producers fixating in all simulations to
defectors fixating in all simulations is increasingly sharp
for larger L (Fig. 2 d for ω = 20, µ = 0.05 and 200
simulations). Thus, this c∗ is the highest cost up which
producers can fixate in large systems. As its value does
not change with L, it is sufficient to use L = 20 for the
values of c∗ presented in this work. Error bars in Fig. 2 c
mark the costs where 30 % or 70 % of all runs fixate to
producers. These error bars are essentially negligable for
our system sizes, even for a relatively small number of 30
simulation runs, except for large ω ' 500 (see Fig. 2 d).
Producer fixation for N0 = 6 players per patch on the
metapopulation is intended for comparison with the sin-
gle patch invasion of Ns = 7 just discussed (six players
of one type per patch, being invaded by one player of the
other type after a hopping event).
We first concentrate on comparing producer fixation in
the metapopulation with what we would expect from the
single patch invasion probability: The empty symbols in
Fig. 2 c) show the cost at which single patch producer
invasion is as likely as single patch defector invasion (for
5Ns = 3 and Ns = 7), while the filled symbols show the
highest cost at which producers fixate in our metapopu-
lation (for N0 = 2 and N0 = 6). We note that we need
to compare metapopulations with N0 players per patch
with single patch invasions of Ns = N0 + 1 players. For
N0 = 2, c
∗ from the single patch invasion probabilities
slightly overestimates c∗ obtained from the metapopula-
tion. The single patch invasion argument overestimates
in this case because the noise in the number of players on
a patch in the metapopulation, caused by hopping, has
a comparatively large effect for this small N0 = 2. For
Ns = 6, single patch and metapopulation results for c
∗
agree very well.
Indeed, the results from the metapopulation also agree
with the numerical value of c∗ obtained from the sin-
gle patch transition probability matrix Tω,2 for N0 = 2
(dashed line), by repeated numerical iteration on the ini-
tial state as discussed in the appendix. Thus, the fact
that single patch dynamics determine the result for c∗
indicates that the question of which species fixates in the
metapopulation is decided by invasion of single patches,
rather than by spatial effects. Hence spatial effects or
pattern formation - often the cause for stabilising pro-
ducers in spatial systems - plays no role in determining
the maximal cost for stabilising the producers in a system
where interactions take place locally.
Before moving on to higher mobilities, we point out
that the values for c∗ (rescaled by N0) in Fig. 2 c scale
linearly in 1/ω, independently of the number of player per
patch N0 studied here, up to numerical accuracy. Thus,
at small mobilities c∗ scales inversely in interaction rate
and number of players per patch.
INCREASING AND HIGH MOBILITY.
We thus established that for low mobilities, the pro-
ducers are stabilised by less frequent interactions up to
a finite cost c∗, which scales as 1/(N0ω). Figure 3 a
shows this c∗ for a variety of hopping rates µ and inter-
action rates ω. For all ω, c∗ saturates for low mobilities:
as long as invasion is the dominating process, the value
of the hopping rate is irrelevant. Paradoxically, c∗ in-
creases, and thus production stabilises, upon increasing
mobilities, where one would normally expect producers
to die out [27–29]. Stabilisations of producers have been
found in more complex models, for example with smarter
strategies, or evolving mobility [65–70]. Here, our simple
model differs from a normal prisoner’s dilemma only by
the reduced interaction frequency and coupled patch ge-
ometry. It is thus interesting that we find stabilisation
of producers in the high, as compared to the low, mobil-
ity limit. Next, we explain the stabilisation in the high
mobility limit.
For high mobilities, rP < ω  µ, players can be con-
sidered as essentially well-mixed. This is the case as long
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FIG. 3: a) Cost c∗ (rescaled by N0 = 6) for different interac-
tion rates ω (lines serve as guide to the eye) and L = 20: For
large mobilities, producers are stabilised and c∗ = 1/N0, as
the fittest player in the metapopulation is a producer when
production cost does not outweigh the contribution from a
single player. b) Snapshots of the number of different fitness
values per producers on a patch (L = 50, ω = 20), for parame-
ters shown by triangles in a): at small µ, patches are occupied
by one type of player only. For higher µ, producers spread
across patches, and the number of different fitness types per
patch increases. c) c∗ in a) reaches its midpoint at µ ≈ ω
(crosses).
as the number of patches L× L is large enough, so that
mixing eliminates correlations, i.e. the total number of
players in the metapopulation should be N  N0. In-
deed, almost all players on a patch for µ = 300 (last
snapshot in Fig. 3 b) have different fitness values, and
producers and defectors both occur on each patch.
Since µ ω in this limit, the precise value of the rate ω
is irrelevant (as long as we maintain ω > rP , so that play-
ers have adjusted their fitness to their environment before
reproduction), and all possible different fitness values of
players will occur. There are as many possible different
fitness values as there are different player configurations
on a patch. In the high mobility limit, the number of
players on a patch can be different from N0 due to hop-
ping, and more than N0 + 1 fitness values per species
are possible in principle. However, since the number of
players in the metapopulation is constant and the mean
number of players per site is N0, we can focus on the
dominant N0 + 1 fitness values. Thus, we can consider
reproduction as a Moran process of all N players in the
well-mixed metapopulation. Since N is large, we are in
a deterministic limit, where the fittest species fixates in
the entire metapopulation. In order to determine if pro-
ducers or defectors survive, we thus need to compare the
fitness of the individual players, and will start with the
fittest producer and defector.
The fittest producer is surrounded only by producers,
and so its fitness is 1 + N0/N0 − c = 2 − c. The fittest
defector is also surrounded only by producers, but since
it is not a producer itself, its environment contains N0−1
6producers; thus, its fitness is 1+(N0−1)/N0 = 2−1/N0.
Similarly, all other defector types have fitnesses lower
by 1/N0 than the corresponding producer fitness type
at zero cost. Thus, if c ≤ 1/N0, all producer fitness
values are equal or higher to the corresponding defector
fitness values. Producers will thus fixate for c ≤ 1/N0,
which corresponds exactly to the high mobility limit in
Fig. 3. This value is independent of ω, and thus the mere
existence of the patch structure and separate time scale
for interaction and reproduction stabilises producers in
this limit.
The term 1/N0 measures the impact of one single
player on the fitness of players (self-interaction). The
fact that this stabilisation occurs in the high mobility
limit is intriguing: it is reminiscent of Hamilton’s rule
of relatedness [29], where production can be stable for
small dispersal speeds in viscous populations [40–42] or
on graphs and social networks [71], or of group selec-
tion that can occur in structured populations. Here, the
stabilisation arises in the high mobility limit for a differ-
ent reason: fit producers exist for all mobilities, as time
scale separation and patch structure mean that players
only sense the fitness within small subgroups. The high
mobility allows these fit producers to take over the pop-
ulation, similarly to how fit species dominate adapting
populations [72].
In Fig. 3 a, c∗ increases smoothly from the low mobility
limit at c∗ ≈ rP /(N0ω) to the high mobility limit at
c∗ = 1/N0 for all interaction rates. We note that for
high ω, c∗ increases more slowly than for low interaction
rates (logarithmic x-axis). Indeed, Fig. 3 c shows that
µ at which c∗ reaches its midpoint is proportional to ω.
Thus, the interplay between these two rates (µ for the
spatial separation and ω for the interaction) selects when
stochastic invasion probabilities and when the fitness of
the fittest player determine the survival of producers.
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In the framework of a prisoner’s dilemma, the cou-
pling of spatial length scales and temporal separation of
interaction and reproduction can lead to stabilisation of
players whose fitness is associated with a cost. We have
shown here that this stabilisation manifests itself differ-
ently for low and high mobilities. For low mobilities,
the stabilisation is proportional to increasing separation
of interaction and reproduction; for high mobilities, the
stabilisation up to c∗ = 1/N0 occurs as long as these
time scales are separate and as long as there is spatial
structure. We also found that the formation of spatial
structure or patterns plays no role in stabilisation of pro-
ducers in a setup where interactions and reproduction
take place in a well-mixed local environment.
Producers are also stabilised to higher costs for high
than for small mobilities in other public goods games,
such as the snowdrift game, if self-interaction is included.
As the interplay of length and time scales can give rise to
such counterintuitive results in simple models, it deserves
further attention in order to guide what models may be
worth exploring with synthetic biological systems.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, we show and explain the transition
probability matrix with N0 = 2 players with one invad-
ing players, i.e. N0 + 1 = 3 players per patch. For every
state with NP ∈ {0, N0} producers there are now addi-
tional states with either one, two or all three players with
fitnesses from their previous patch, corresponding to five
additional states. Since it does not matter whether the
absorbing states are updated or not, we can ignore the
additional absorbing states (with all producers or defec-
tors, but varying number of players with updated fitness).
Thus, we obtain a total of fourteen states.
These states are structured as follows: states 1-4 are
shown in Fig. 2 b. State 5-14 are structured such that all
states with odd numbers contain two producers and one
defector, and all states with even numbers contain two
defectors and one producers. In states 5 and 6, a single
producer retains fitness fP from it’s previous patch, and
in states 7 and 8, a single defector retains its fitness fD =
1 from its previous patch. States 9-12 contain two players
that retain their fitness: in states 9 and 10, only one
producer is fully updated, and in states 11-12, only a
single defector is fully updated. In states 13 and 14,
all players retain their fitness from their previous patch:
in state 13, the two producers have fitness fP = 2 − c
and the defector has fitness fD = 1, while in state 14,
the producer has fitness fP and the two defectors have
fitness fD. Our reproduction rate r
D/P
i is proportional
to the corresponding fitness. The transition matrix thus
reads
7Tω,2 =
1 rD1 /F1 0 0 0 r
D
1 /F6 (r
D+rD1 )/F7 0 0 r
D/F10 0 (r
D+rP1 )/F12 0 2r
D/F14
0 rD1 /F1 r
D
2 /F2 0 r
D
2 /F5 2ω/F6 (r
D
1 +2ω)/F7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 rP1 /F1 r
P
2 /F2 0 (r
P
2 +2ω)/F5 0 r
P
1 /F7 2ω/F8 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 rP2 /F2 1 (r
P
2 +r
P )/F5 0 0 2r
P
2 /F8 (r
P+rP2 )/F9 0 2r
P /F11 0 2r
P /F13 0
0 0 0 0 4ω/F5 0 0 0 2ω/F9 0 4ω/F11 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 rD2 /F5 (2r
D
1 +4ω)/F6 0 0 0 0 2r
D
2 /F11 (r
D
1 +2ω)/F12 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 4ω/F7 0 0 (2r
D+2ω)/F10 0 2ω/F12 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 rP1 /F7 (2r
P
2 +4ω)/F8 (r
P
2 +2ω)/F9 2r
P
1 /F10 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2ω/F9 0 0 0 4ω/F13 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 rD/r7 2r
D/F8 r
D/F9 (r
D+2ω)/F10 0 0 0 2ω/F14
0 0 0 0 rP /F5 2r
P /F6 0 0 0 0 (2rC+2ω)/F11 r
P /F12 2ω/F13 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 2ω/F12 0 4ω/F14
0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 rP /F9 0 0 r
P /F12 2r
P /F13 2r
P /F14
0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 rD/F9 0 0 r
D/F12 2r
D/F13 2r
D/F14

,
where F1 = 2r
D
1 + r
P
1 ,
F2 = r
D
2 + 2r
P
1 ,
F5 = 6ω + 2(r
P + rD2 + r
P
2 ),
F6 = 6ω + 2(r
P + 2rD1 ),
F7 = 6ω + 2(r
D + rD1 + r
P
1 ),
F8 = 6ω + 2(r
D + 2rP2 ),
F9 = 6ω + 2(r
D + rP + rP2 ),
F10 = 6ω + 2(2r
D + rP1 ),
F11 = 6ω + 2(2r
P + rD2 ),
F12 = 6ω + 2(r
D + rP + 2rD1 ),
F13 = 6ω + 2(2r
P + rD),
and F14 = 6ω + 2(r
P + 2rD) [75].
The successful invasion probability can be obtained by
numerical iteration of this matrix on the probability vec-
tor corresponding to our initial state (corresponding to
state 13 or 14 for an invading defector or producer, re-
spectively), or alternatively by matrix inversion as de-
tailed in Ref. [73].
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